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Abstract 
 
It is true that different approaches have been utilised to accelerate the computation 
of discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curves with Pollard’s Rho method. However, 
trapping in cycles fruitless will be obtained by using the random walks with Pollard’s Rho. 
An efficient alternative approach that is based on new collisions which are reliant on the 
values ai , bi to solve this problem is proposed. This may requires less iterations than 
Pollard’s Rho original in reaching collision. Thus, the performance of Pollard’s Rho 
method is more efficiently because the improved method not only reduces the number of 
mathematical operations but these collisions can also applied on previous improvements 
which reported in the literature.  
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Introduction  
The technology of public key cryptography has been proposed by Diffie and 
Hellman in 1976 (Diffie and Hellman, 1976) whereas the elliptic curve cryptosystems 
(ECCs) that is dependent on this technology were first proposed separately by Koblitz     
and Miller in 1985 (Miller, 1986; Koblitz, 1987). The security of these cryptographic                       
systems is reliant on the hardness of solving the discrete logarithm problem on elliptic 
curves (ECDLP). These schemes will be broken easily if this problem can be resolved 
efficiently. Despite the fact that there are several attacking methods to resolve ECDLP, 
Pollard’s Rho method (Pollard, 1980) not only is at present known as the fastest    
algorithm to resolve the discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curves, but its parallelized 
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variant as well because its mathematical operations is less than other methods like Baby-
Step Giant-Step (Shanks, 1971). This encourages researchers to utilise from automorphism 
of the group (Duursma et al., 1990), random walk on certain equivalence classes (Wiener 
and Zuccherato, 1999; Gallant et al., 2000), parallelization (Oorschot and Wiener, 
1999), iteration function (Teske, 1998; 2001), negation map (Wang and Zhang, 2012) or 
cycle detection (Brent, 1980; Cheon et al., 2012; Ezzouak et al., 2014) to improve this 
attacking method. This paper will provide a new approach by using the theorem that 
proposed by Sadkhan and Neamah in 2010 (Sadkhan and Neamah, 2011) to improve 
Pollard’s Rho method which use alternative collisions to resolve the ECDLP. After that, the 
developed method will be analysed by giving examples. 
 
Background 
In this section, the mathematical background of elliptic curve cryptography and     
the Pollard Rho (Pollard, 1980) method that uses an iteration function to make a succession 
of elements will be presented. This technique utilises cycle detection to find collision or a 
match. This matching will contribute to the solution of ECDLP. 
 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) 
Elliptic Curves over the prime field pF  can be defined by the equation                             
y
2
 = x
3
 + ax + b, where 4a
3
 + 27b
2
  0. Different curves can be generated by changing         
the values a and b which belongs to pF . The set of points (x, y) that satisfy this equation 
equipped with the addition operation forms a group, denoted by E ( pF ). This operation can 
be defined over elliptic curves with a particular point O which is called the identity or the 
point at infinity. If P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2) belongs to E ( pF ), P ⊕ Q = R = (x3, y3) can 
be added as follows: 
(1) If P = O , Q = O or P = O and Q = O then R respectively equal Q, P or O. 
(2) If Q = ⊖ P = (x 1, – y 1) and P ⊕ ( ⊖ P) =  O. 
(3) Otherwise  P ⊕ Q = (x 3, y3) where  
x3 =  
2
 –  x 1 – x 2,     y3 =  (x1 – x 3) – y 1 
                And  
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In ECCs, obtaining the public key is made out multiplying the private key that is a 
random number k, belongs to the interval [1, n – 1] with a point P which has order n. The 
point P is called the generator of a cyclic group P  = {O, P, [2]P, . . . , [n – 1]P}, and       
its order can be defined as the smallest positive scalar n such that [n]P = O which                       
symbolized by ord (P). The strength of the ECCs security is reliant on the ECDLP. This 
problem can be defined as follows: Let P has order n, which belongs to the points of an 
elliptic curve defined over the field pF  and a point Q  P , then finding k  [1, n – 1] 
such that Q = [k]P =   
timesk
PPP    is called the discrete log of Q to the                      
base P which is symbolized by k = Qlog P . Because k can be inferred from Q if the     
ECDLP is easy, so the difficulty of the ECDLP plays a crucial role in the security                     
of these cryptographic systems (Hankerson et al., 2004 ; Chee and Park, 2005). 
 
Theorem  
Let Q a point belongs to group points that generated by P where                                      
ord (P) = n, and R can be calculated as follows: [a]P  [b]Q where a, b  [1, n – 1]             
then the following equations can be obtained (Sadkhan and Neamah, 2011) : 
1) If R = O and gcd (b, n) = 1 then Qlog P  = 
b
an 
 mod n. 
2) If R = P and gcd (b, n) = 1then Qlog P  = 
b
a1
 mod n. 
3) If R = Q and gcd (1 – b, n) = 1 then Qlog P  = 
b
a
1
 mod n. 
4) If R = ⊖  P and gcd (b, n) = 1 then Qlog P  = 
b
a1
 mod n. 
5) If R = ⊖ Q and gcd (– 1 – b, n) = 1 then Qlog P  = 
b
a
1
 mod n.  
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Pollard’s Rho Method 
The Pollard idea is to find k which is satisfying Q = [k]P by dividing the group of 
points on an elliptic curve into three disjoint sets S1, S2 and S3 which have an almost equal 
size. Define the original iteration function on a point R as follows: 
                      R  P,          
 
if  R  S1, 
      f(R) =      [2]R,                if  R  S2,                                                              (1)                              
                      R  Q,          if  R  S3,  
 
Start with a point R0 = [a0]P  [b0]Q where a0
 
, b0  [1, n – 1] are randomly chosen 
and make a sequence  Ri  by using  this function until the collision occurs. The sequence Ri  
can be expressed as [ai]P  [bi]Q, where the numbers ai, bi ∈ [1, n − 1] are calculated as 
following:  
                  (ai + 1) mod n     if  Ri  S1,                                     bi                                   if  Ri  S1,   
 
 ai+1 =         2ai mod n           if  Ri  S2,        and     bi+1 =          2bi mod n            if  Ri  S2,                       
                
                    ai,                       if  Ri  S3,                                   (bi + 1) mod n      if  Ri  S3, 
Since the number of points that lies in the curve that form cyclic group is a finite, 
this sequence will not only become periodic after applying this function but will start to 
repeat. Upon detection of a matching, this is Ri = Rj [ ai]P  [bi]Q = [aj]P  [bj]Q,    
if gcd (bj – bi, n) = 1,  k can be obtained as follows (Wiener and Zuccherato, 1999) :    
k = Qlog P    = (
ij
ji
bb
aa


) mod n 
 
Example 1 
Let y
2 
= x
3
 +
 
130x
 
+
 
565 an elliptic curve is defined over F719, and let                                
P = (312, 90) point has order 233 on elliptic curve points. The discrete logarithm of point                     
Q = (475, 662) to the base P can be computed as follows: 
The points of this curve are { O , (0, 224), . . . .  . . . . , (718, 282), (718, 437)}, the 
partitions of these points as follows: 
S1 = { O, (0, 224), (0, 495), . . . . . , (238, 302), (238, 417)} 
S2 = {(241, 293), (241, 426), . . . . . , (475, 57), (475, 662)}, 
S3 = {(481, 169), (481, 550), . . . . . , (718, 282), (718, 437)}. 
Let a0, b0  [1, n – 1] are selected as follows: a0= 2, b0 = 87  then R0 can computed 
as follows: [a0]P  [b0]Q =  [2](312, 90)  [87](475 , 662) =  (312, 90)  
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Table (1) shows the intermediate steps of Pollard’s Rho method. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since R4 = R18 = (665, 336), then [a4]P  [b4]Q = [a18]P  [b18]Q 
[10](312, 90)  [117](475, 662) = [84](312, 90)  [31](475, 90) 
Which gives  
k = 233mod
418
184
bb
aa


=
11731
8410


 mod 233 = (159) 1147  mod 233 =158 
Thus k = Qlog P = 158. 
 
Example 2 
Let y
2 
=
 
x
3 
+
 
250
 
x
 
+
 
844 an elliptic curve is defined over F1009, and let                             
P = (909, 601) point has order 1007 on elliptic curve points. The discrete logarithm of point                
Q = (134, 52) to the base P can be computed as follows: 
The points of this curve are { O , (2, 315), . . . .  . . . . , (1007, 423), (1007, 586)}, 
the partitions of these points as follows: 
S1 = { O, (2, 315), (2, 694), . . . . . , (335, 138), (335, 871)} 
S2 = {(338, 328), (338, 681), . . . . . , (688, 407), (688, 602)}, 
S3 = {(691, 67), (691, 942), . . . . . , (1007, 423), (1007, 586)}. 
 Let a0, b0  [1, n – 1] are chosen as follows: a0= 46, b0 = 229 then R0 can calculated 
as follows:  [a0]P  [b0]Q =  [46](909, 601)  [229](134 , 52) =  (981, 997)  
i Ri ai bi 
0 (312, 90) = P 2 87 
1 (567, 38) 4 174 
2 (56, 560) 4 175 
3 (366, 290) 5 175 
4 (665, 336) 10 117 
5 (508, 598) 10 118 
6 (400, 173) 10 119 
7 (63, 276) 20 5 
8 (422, 356) 21 5 
9 (548, 457) 42 10 
10 (676, 651) 42 11 
11 (671, 150) 42 12 
12 ( 312, 629) = ⊖ P 42 13 
13 (567, 681) 84 26 
14 (670, 259) 84 27 
15   (636, 198) 84 28 
16 (627, 111) 84 29 
17   (630, 529) 84 30 
18 (665, 336) 84 31 
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Table (2) shows the intermediate steps of Pollard’s Rho method. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since R22 = R48 = (164, 541), then [a22]P  [b22]Q = [a48]P  [b48]Q 
[838](909, 601)  [108](134, 52) = [129](909, 601)  [736](134, 52) 
i Ri ai bi 
0 (981, 997) 46 229 
1 (909, 601) =  P 46 230 
2   (376, 671) 46 231 
3 (113, 377) 92 462 
4 (387, 58) 93 462 
5 (482, 151) 186 924 
6 (990, 873) 372 841 
7 (30, 821) 372 842 
8 (449, 876) 373 842 
9 (434, 695) 746 677 
10 (585, 82) 485 347 
11 (974, 474) 970 694 
12 (621, 167) 970 695 
13 (502, 420) 933 383 
14 (841, 440) 859 766 
15 (160, 95) 859 767 
16 (696, 855) 860 767 
17 (368, 23) 860 768 
18 (890, 335) 713 529 
19 (657, 202) 713 530 
20 (776, 151) 419 53 
21 (445, 612) 419 54 
22 (164, 541) 838 108 
23 (993, 794) 839 108 
24 (382, 677) 839 109 
25 (454, 843) 671 218 
26 (128, 749) 335 436 
27 (819, 254) 336 436 
28 (168, 891) 336 437 
29 (932, 481) 337 437 
30 (818, 301) 337 438 
31 (270, 996) 337 439 
32 (809, 842) 338 439 
33 (206, 940) 338 440 
34 (15, 152) 339 440 
35 (597, 348) 340 440 
36 (14,1004) 680 880 
37 (595, 332) 681 880 
38 (449, 133) 355 753 
39 (434, 314) 710 499 
40 (585, 927) 413 998 
41 (974, 535) 826 989 
42 (607, 458) 826 990 
43 (660, 171) 645 973 
44 (72, 278) 283 939 
45 (351, 287) 284 939 
46 (662, 783) 568 871 
47 (697, 56) 129 725 
48 (164, 541) 129 736 
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Which gives  
k = 1007mod
2248
4822
bb
aa


=
108736
129838


 mod 1007 = (709) 1628  mod 1007 = 766 
Thus k = Qlog P = 766. 
 
Improving Pollard’s Rho Method by Using New Equations 
The main idea of alternative collision of pollard’s Rho on elliptic curve group 
method is that looks for a new collision in the group. Using the equations has been 
proposed by Sadkhan and Neamah (Sadkhan and Neamah, 2011) in Theorem above can 
not only significantly contribute to improving this method by reducing the mathematical 
operations but collision-detection algorithms can also be applied. Elliptic curve points over 
field pF  divide into three disjoint sets S1, S2 and S3 with iterative function defined as 
follows:  
                      R  P,          
 
if  R  S1, 
      f(R) =      [2] R,             if  R  S2,                                                              (2)                              
                      R  Q,          if  R  S3,  
The sequence Ri  can be expressed as  [ai]P  [bi]Q, where the numbers ai, bi ∈        
[1,  n − 1] are calculated as following:  
                  (ai + 1) mod n     if  Ri  S1,                                     bi                                   if  Ri  S1,   
 
 ai+1 =         2ai mod n           if  Ri  S2,        and     bi+1 =          2bi mod n            if  Ri  S2,                       
                
                    ai,                       if  Ri  S3,                                   (bi + 1) mod n      if  Ri  S3, 
The collision-detection will occur with the following equations after applying the 
iteration function: 
1) If  Ri = O and gcd (bi , n) = 1      then k = Qlog P  = 
i
i
b
an 
 mod n  
2) If  Ri = P and gcd (bi , n) = 1         then k = Qlog P  = 
i
i
b
a1
 mod n. 
3) If  Ri = Q and gcd (1 – bi , n) = 1  then k = Qlog P  = 
i
i
b
a
1
 mod n. 
4) If  Ri = ⊖ P and gcd (bi , n) = 1     then k = Qlog P  = 
i
i
b
a1
 mod n. 
5) If  Ri = ⊖ Q and gcd (– 1 – bi , n) = 1 then k = Qlog P  = 
i
i
b
a
1
 mod n. 
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 If such collisions cannot be obtained, the original collision Ri = Rj, or the reverse 
collision Ri = ⊖ Rj respectively can be applied as follows: 
i) Qlog P  can be obtained as follows: k = (
ij
ji
bb
aa


) mod n, if gcd (bj – bi, n) = 1.  
ii) Qlog P  can be obtained as follows: k = (
ji
ji
bb
aa


) mod n, if gcd ( – bi – bj, n) = 1. 
  
Example 3 
From example (1) since Ri = R0 = P  and gcd (87 , 233) = 1 then condition (2) can 
be applied  k = Qlog P  = 
0
01
b
a
 mod n = 
87
232
 mod 233 = (232) 187  mod 233 = 158. 
Thus k = Qlog P = 158. 
Or, 
Since Ri = R12 = ⊖ P and gcd (13 , 233) = 1 then the condition (4) can also be 
applied  k = Qlog P  =  
12
121
b
a
mod n = 
13
190
 mod 233 = (190) 113 mod 233 = 158. 
Thus k = Qlog P = 158. 
 
Example 4 
From example (2) since R8
 
= ⊖ R38 and gcd (419, 1007) = 1 then the condition (ii) 
can be applied k =
 
388
388
bb
aa


mod n = 
753842
355373


mod1007
 
= (728) 1419   mod 1007 = 766. 
Thus k = Qlog P = 766. 
Or, 
Since Ri = R1 = P and gcd (230 , 1007) = 1 then the condition (2) can also be  
applied k = Qlog P  =
1
11
b
a
 mod 1007 = 
230
962
  mod 1007 = (962) 1230  mod 1007 = 766. 
Thus k = Qlog P = 766. 
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Comparison between Methods 
Analysing the methods play a crucial role in computer programming, so knowing 
the best methods is depended on this analysis because there are many methods available to 
a specific application. The performance of these methods such as Pollard's Rho can be 
evaluated by computing mathematical operations. If such methods have fewer steps than 
others, running time will be the best. Therefore, the developed Pollard’s Rho method that 
implemented in these examples have shown the mathematical operations can be reduced 
from 18 to 1 or 12 operations with respect to the first example, and from 48 to 2 operations 
or 38 in the worst case by using the reverse collision Ri = ⊖ Rj with respect to the second 
example. These examples have utilised prime numbers with size between three and four 
digits. The tables 1 & 2 of these examples show that the intermediate steps of Pollard’s 
Rho method. The experimental results for this method with its new equations have been 
certainly improved because the point Q belong to a cyclic group which generated by P will 
always contain the points P, Q, ⊖ P, ⊖ Q and O in this group. This implies these 
collisions not only have always occur but the probability of a collision has also increased 
five times compared with original method. It can be concluded that the proposed improved 
method is not only better than the original pollard’s Rho method but these alternative 
collisions can also be applied to previous proposed improvements such that dividing the 
iteration function into about 20 sets (Teske, 1998; 2001).  
 
Conclusion 
The improved Pollard's Rho method has been outlined by using new collisions. 
These collisions are reliant on values a0 and b0 that have been playing a significant role in 
reducing the total number of mathematical operations if these values are chosen carefully. 
This means selecting these numbers will significantly contribute to solve the ECDLP 
quickly. This modified method can be considered as an important addition to methods of 
improving the Pollard’s Rho. Although these results are related to small prime finite fields, 
this can represent a good reduction of complexity when it is applied by using large prime 
numbers. The parallel collision search can also be applied by selecting different start points 
which have different values a0 and b0 for each processor in order to produce their own 
sequences of points, so the chance of collision will be considerably increased. This means 
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the collision may not only occur with the points P, Q, ⊖ P , ⊖ Q and O more than once 
but also with the points Rj and ⊖ Rj  in the worst case.  
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